This paper reports an experimental test of the relative eciency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, (ii) improves the targeting of evaders and (iii) raises the tax levy.
Introduction
The tax evasion problem has initially been modeled by Allingham & Sandmo (1972) as a portfolio choice where taxpayers decide of the share of real income they report by comparing expected costs to expected benets. Following this seminal work, substantial research eorts have been devoted to the study of deterrent policies, from the impact of the probability of detection, to the severity of punishment upon detection. Moreover, information being at the heart of this principal-agent relationship, as taxpayers have their real income as private information, several types of signals have been studied in the literature: past evasion history (Landsberger & Meilijson 1982 , Greenberg 1984 , declaration choices (Reinganuum & Wilde 1988 , Cremer et al. 1990 , Beck & Jung 1989 , Sanchez & Sobel 1993 , Erard & Feinstein 1994 , Rhoades 1999 , and conspicuous consumption (Yaniv 2013) .
So far, little attention has been paid to whistleblowing-based audit schemes (thereafter wbas) that could, however, be a useful source of information for tax administrations. Indeed, wbas provides private information that is otherwise dicult and costly to collect and therefore allows to $ We are grateful to the participants of the shadow annual conference (2013, Munster) , the International Tax Analysis conference (2014, London) , the TARC workshop (2015, UK) and the LAMETA-LEEM workgroup for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank the University of Montpellier for funding (BUSR 2014) .target audits more accurately on misreporting taxpayers. Whistleblowing is a widespread practice showing quick developments in recent time. For instance, the american IRS has created an ocial whistleblower oce in 2006 with the objective of increasing tax revenue by using private information provided by whistleblowers. In line with this, the present paper adresses the question of the relative eciency of a wbas compared to a standard random-based audit scheme (thereafter rbas). Traditionally audits eciency is analyzed by considering their direct and indirect eects on tax revenue. The direct eect refers to the impact on tax revenue of the degree of accuracy of the audit scheme (net of its operating cost). In particular, more big sh cases within the audited population of taxpayers would result in higher reimbursement of evaded taxes and higher payment of resulting nes (if proportional to the amount evaded). The indirect eect corresponds to a selfcompliance eect implying that the behavior of all taxpayers is aected by the characteristics of the audit scheme. Indeed, the more taxpayers perceive the audit scheme as dissuasive the less they would evade. Therefore, at constant operating cost, a better targeted and/or a more dissuasive audit scheme would have an unambiguous positive impact on tax revenue.
In the theoretical literature on tax evasion and audit design, only few contributions consider the possibility of whistleblowing. To the best of our knowledge, Yaniv (2001) has been the rst to model and to incorporate an informing decision, precisely the possibility for individuals to inform the tax administration about evaders, in the optimization problem faced by the tax administration of selecting optimal prosecution eorts and rewards for informants. More recently, Mealem et al. (2010) compare reporting decisions facing a one-round random audit or a two-round whistleblowingbased audit. In the latter, taxpayers are invited to denounce evaders who have escaped a random audit in the rst round and only the denounced taxpayers are randomly audited in the secondround. Mealem et al. (2010) point out that the tax administration would clearly perform better using a whistleblowing-based audit if and only if whistleblowers are honest, that is, if and only if they denounce real evaders. On the contrary, if evaders are able to reduce their own audit probability through false denunciations and do so (strategic whistleblowers), the two schemes might become equivalent. In addition, if honest whistleblowers nd no sucient incentives to denounce real evaders, then the whistleblowing-based audit might even become less ecient.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one experimental study by Masclet et al. (2013) introducing whistleblowing in the context of tax evasion. They investigate the impact on tax evasion of providing information to taxpayers on the use of tax revenue (credit carbon purchase) in three dierent dynamic contexts: (i) a baseline treatment with a cut o rule associated with a retroactive audit, (ii) an information treatment which only diers from the baseline treatment by providing the income declaration rates of all other group members, (iii) a denunciation treatment identical to the information treatment in which each one has the opportunity to blow the whistle and where each denounced taxpayers is audited, meaning that the tax administration faces no budget constraint.
Hence, by comparing (ii) and (iii) they observed that allowing for whistleblowing opportunities reduces tax evasion.
By constrast with existing litterature, the present paper focuses on the question of the eciency of an audit scheme based on whistleblowing. As a starting point, we nd necessary to put aside any particular incentive to denounce (e.g. rewards, denunciation costs, revenge), and to guarantee that operating costs are kept constant (i.e. independent of the audit scheme implemented). Moreover, for clarity sake, we chose to compare the wbas to a benchmark rbas. In our whistleblowingbased audit scheme, each taxpayer's probability of being audited is determined by his relative whistleblowing score. We show that under the wbas, compared to under the rbas, (i) the monetary amount of tax evasion decreases, (ii) the targeting of evaders is improved and (iii) the tax levy raises.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the experimental procedure and design and section 3 exposes the corresponding theoretical framework and predictions. Results of the experiment are presented in section 4 and we conclude in section 5.
Experimental procedure and design
The experiment was run in the experimental lab of Montpellier (LAMETA-LEEM, France).
Participants were recruited from a pool of 4000 volunteer students from various elds of study of the University.
1 Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants seated in front of a computer terminal and were asked to silently and individually read the instructions. Once all the participants had nished, an experimenter read the instructions aloud. Participants then lled in a computerized questionnaire in order to check their understanding of the instructions. 2 Participants were informed they could raise their hand at any moment to ask for additional private explanations.
The experiment consists of an income reporting game under two audit treatments: one with a rbas and one with a wbas. The two treatments were conducted in an identical manner with two independent successive parts. At the beginning of the experiment participants were told that they were going to receive instructions for part 2 at the end of part 1, and that their nal payo for the experiment would be the cumulative payo of the two parts. In part 1 subjects participated to a simple real-money portfolio choice aiming at capturing their sensitivity to risky decisions.
3
More precisely participants had an initial endowment of 10 euros and had to decide its allocation between a safe asset with return rate normalized to unity and an actuarially favorable risky asset with rate of returnk = (0, 1/2; 3, 1/2), i.e. with probability one half they lose the amount invested and with probability one half they get back three times their investment. Without any information about the result of part 1, subjects then participated in part 2, that is a repeated income reporting 1 For the management of the subject pool the LEEM uses ORSEE (Online Recruitment Software for Economic Experiment, Greiner (2004) ).
2 The program for the experiment has been developed using LE2M (Software for the Economic Experiments of Montpellier, D. Dubois). 3 We applied the same portfolio choice and procedure than in Beaud & Willinger (2015) .
game. 4 We ran two sessions of 20 subjects for each treatment leading therefore to a total of 80 participants in the experiment.
At the beginning of the income reporting game, groups of ve players were randomly formed and kept unchanged for the whole repetitions. We thus collected eight independent data (groups)
for each treatment. The game consists in 20 repetitions, with each repetition including 3 steps. In step 1, players are endowed with an income of 100 ecus 5 and must decide how much of their income to report. In step 2 they are informed about the amount of their tax (20% of the reported income) and about the reported income of each of the four other members of their group, identied by a letter, B, C, D, or E kept unchanged for the whole game. In the whistleblowing treatment, the only dierence is that at that stage players are asked whether they want or not to denounce all, any or none of their group members. To this purpose additional lines are displayed on the screen with the labels 6 Do you want to denounce member B/C/D/E? and two radio buttons Yes and No are displayed and record the answer given in a click. As a consequence each subject can be denounced zero, one, two, three or four times. Finally in step 3 players are individually informed whether or not they have been audited. In case of prosecution subjects have to reimburse the amount of tax evaded and, in addition, have to pay a ne rate equal to 150% of this amount (leading to a penalty rate of 250%). Last, the summary of the period is displayed. Some important points here are that players are not informed of (i) whether they have been audited because they have been denounced or not; (ii) the number of denouncements for themselves or the others, and (iii) who else has been audited in the group. Finally, players have the possibility, at any moment, to check the history of past periods.
In both treatments, two subjects within the ve members of the group are audited and, therefore, the operating cost for the tax administration is kept constant. Under the random-based audit scheme the two audited subjects are randomly selected, while the selection process depends on the relative number of denouncements under the whistleblowing-based audit scheme. Precisely, the two audited subjects are those who have been the most denounced in the current period. If there are more than two players with the maximum number of denouncements, the two audited subjects are randomly drawn within this set. If there is only one subject with the maximum number of denouncements, he/she is automatically selected and the second audited subject is selected among those remaining and showing the maximum number of denouncements. Once again, in case of equality in this set, one subject is randomly drawn within this set. This process follows up this way until the selection of two players in the group. 4 All periods of this part were paid. 5 Experimental Currency Unit. The conversion rate was given in the instructions: 100 ecus = 0.75 euros. 6 There are four lines, one for each member B, C, D, and E. 
The tax administration is assumed to audit n ∈ {2, ..., N } agents within the population.The audit procedure is supposed to perfectly reveal the true income. Thus, the wealth of a non-audited indivual is [1 − t] W i + te i , while the wealth of an audited individual is [1 − t] W i − θte i , where θ is the ne rate applied to the amount of tax evaded. An individual i is audited with probability p i .
In this context, the net wealth of an individual i is an endogenous random variable which may be written:
where w i = [1 − t] W i is his exogenous net wealth with no evasion and where
is a simple binary lottery taking value −θt with probability p i and value t with probability 1 − p i .
Thus, evasion may be viewed as a gamble and an individual's decision to evade depends on his willingness to bear the risk of a random tax rate t. No exposition to this risk is obtained with no evasion (e i = 0), while full exposition is obtained with full evasion (e i = W i ). Clearly, all riskneutral individuals would be indierent between any level of evasion if and only if t is actuarially neutral with E t = 0. Otherwise, all risk-neutral agents would either chose no evasion if t is an unfair gamble with E t < 0, or full evasion if t is a fair one with E t > 0.
In the treatment where the audit procedure follows a random-based audit scheme, subjects only have to choose the amount of income to report to the tax administration and each subject is audited with probability n/N = 2/5. According to the parameters of the experiment, the random return of evasion is t = (−0.3, 2/5; 0.2, 3/5). Thus, evasion is an actuarially-neutral gamble with E t = 0.
Therefore all risk-neutral subjects should be indierent between all possible level of evasion. As a result, full evasion (e i = W i ) is the optimal choice for all risk-prone subjects who, by denition, accept all the gambles for which risk-neutral subjects are indierent whereas no evasion (e i = 0)
is the optimal choice for all risk-averse subjects who, by denition, reject all the gambles for which risk-neutral agent are indierent.
In the treatment where the audit procedure is based on denouncements, for each member of their group for whom they observe the amount declared, subjects are also asked to signal evasion or no-evasion. Clearly, because relatively more denounced subjects are audited with relatively greater probability, to blow the whistle on others would either decrease or keep constant one own audit probability and, therefore, whistleblowing is a weakly dominant strategy. Indeed, whatever the amount declared and the signal reported to the tax administration by the other members of his/her group, a subject would perform at least as good by signaling any other member as an evader to the tax administration. Therefore, whenever subjects' preferences are independent, each subject would systematically report as much evaders as possible to the tax administration. As a result, if each subject adopts his weakly dominant strategy, each subject is denounced four times and is audited with the same probability p i = 2/5, as in the rbas treatment. We conclude that, under these assumptions, no dierence should be observed among our two treatments.
Experimental results
Result 1. The monetary amount of tax evasion is smaller under the whistleblowing-based audit scheme than under the random-based audit scheme.
[Insert table 1 and figure 1 here] Table 1 reports the monetary amount of tax evasion by group in each treatment. Figure 1 reports the evolution of the average monetary amount of tax evasion over time in each treatment.
Introducing whistleblowing opportunities decreases the average tax evasion as soon as the rst period of play, that is just after the reading of the instructions and therefore without any experience with the audit scheme. A chi-square test conrms that the two distributions dier signicantly (χ 2 (4) = 138.951, pvalue< 0.001). In contrast, there is no statistically signicant dierence in average frequencies of tax evasion among treatments (55.63% under the rbas and 51.00% under the wbas; MW p-value = 0.318).
7 Thereafter MW. Since the statistically independent unit in our experiment is the group, the MW tests are performed on data by group, the statistical values of each of the 8 groups of one treatment is compared to the (same) statistical values of each of the 8 groups of the other treatment. 8 Statistical analysis has been done using the R software (R Core Team 2013).
Moreover, the amount of tax evasion is smaller in the wbas as soon as the rst period of play -where no audit as ever been implemented so that it is the only period in the experiment where we can observe the pure indirect eect of audit -which means that taxpayers expect the audit probability to be higher than in the rbas. This highlight the greater dissuasive eect of the wbas, and suggests that taxpayers expect the audit probability to be higher in case of evasion.
Result 2. The whistleblowing-based audit scheme better targets evaders than the random-based audit scheme.
[Insert table 2 and figure 3 here]
In our model, as in Mealem et al. (2010) , all subjects are expected to blow the whistle strategically, that is by denouncing honest taxpayers in order to reduce their own probability of being audited (because it is a weakly dominant strategy, as discussed in section 3). However, in the experiment we observed only 39.63% of such false strategic denounciations (table 2) . On average taxpayers blew the whistle on 2.45 group members, which is signicantly less than four (Wilcoxon one-sided p-value = 0.004). Figure 3 shows that the average monetary amount of tax evasion and the average number of denouncements follow a common trend.
[Insert table 3 and figure 4 here]
To question subjects' overestimation of the probability of detection, table 3 reports, by treatment, the empirical probability of detection for evaders and non evaders. We observe that the empirical probability for an evader to be detected is 50.01% under the wbas, whereas it is 38.84%
under the rbas. Recalling that the theoretical probability of detection is 2/5 = 40% in the experiment, we can assert that the wbas allows for a better targeting of evaders at constant operating cost. Furthermore, the empirical probability for a non evader to be detected is 32.25% under the wbas, whereas it is 38.75% under the rbas. This suggests that the wbas has got a great advantage in terms of procedural equity. In addition, gure 4 supports that there exists a positive correlation between the number of time a subject is denounced and the monetary amount of his/her tax evasion. Averages are positively correlated (Pearson correlation test ρ = 0.402, p-value = 0.010) and there exists a positive linear relationship (coecient 0.017 p-value = 0.010).
Result 3. The tax levy is signicantly greater under the whistleblowing-based audit scheme than under the random-based audit scheme.
Finally, an important question for the tax administration is the impact of the audit scheme on the amount of tax collected. So far we analyzed the data at the group level. To conclude this section we will focus on individual choice and more precisely on the determinants of subjects' evasion decision. To this end we estimate panel data models, where the dependent variable is the reported income of an individual i in period t. The independent variables are the treatment, the reported income in t − 1, having or not being audited in t − 1 and the number of denouncements made by the players in t − 1. We also added three variables that subjects could have easily computed: the average income reported by the other taxpayers in the group in t − 1, the minimum and the maximum of the reported income in the group in t − 1. Finally we included the taxpayer's gender in the model. Estimations are reported in table 5. In the left column we estimated a model with random individual eects. 9 In the second and third columns we estimated dynamic panel model following Arellano & Bond (1991) 's procedure. 10 The second column reports estimated coecients for the whistleblowing treatment and the third column for the random treatment.
As already mentioned there is a strong treatment eect. In line with Result 1, the introduction of whistleblowing opportunities signicantly increases the income reported by subjects. The independent variable`audit' has a strong impact on the amount reported in the current period.
Noteworthy the sign of the impact diers among treatments. Under the rbas, consecutively to an audit, taxpayers signicantly decreased their reported income, recalling the bomb crater eect (Mittone 2006) . Conversely the audit has an opposite positive eect under the wbas. This suggests that while under a rbas subjects seem to consider that being audited decreases the probability to be audited in the next period, with the wbas this perceived probability is increased. Also, it is only under the wbas that subjects take into account the average reported income by the other members of their group. In particular, if the average reported income of a subject's group increases, the amount the subject reports increases too. Finally, we observed no gender eect. 9 We used the R package plm (Croissant & Millo 2008) . 10 We used the pgmm command of the plm package. The instrumental variable of the model is the report with a lag of two periods.
Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme (wbas) upon taxpayers' reporting decisions. To this purpose, we built an experiment aiming at comparing its relative eciency compared to that of a standard random-based audit scheme (rbas), keeping operating costs constant for the tax administration. Thus in both treatments the same number of taxpayers are audited. When whistleblowing opportunities are open, audits are triggered by decreasing order of denouncements scores. Therefore, a potential drawback of whistleblowing schemes is that taxpayers may strategically use denunciation to decrease their own probability of being audited, through extensive and false denunciations. This is our theoretical prediction since denuncing anyone is a weakly dominant strategy, such that both audit schemes become equivalent. However, in our experiment the wbas appears to be more ecient than the rbas as (i) the monetary amount of tax evasion decreases, (ii) targeting of evaders is improved and (iii) the tax levy raises.
In practice, audit eciency is discussed by distinguishing its direct (or deterrent) and indirect (or dissuasive) eects. Our experimental data show that the wbas dominates the rbas on both dimensions. Regarding the direct eect, the wbas provides a better targetting on evaders, so that procedural equity is improved. Whereas concerning the indirect eect, our results show that taxpayers react to the wbas by a strong increase in reported income from the very rst period, even without observing to what extent whistleblowing is actually used in the population.
Thus, taxpayers seem to believe, ex ante, that people are prone to blow the whistle so that their likelihood of being audited would be greater than under the rbas. In addition, although the amount of collected tax is almost similar under both audit schemes in our experiment, it may well be strongly dierent in practice as post audit tax returns are very low and costly to levy for the tax administration. For instance, in France, two years after prosecution, the tax administration has a post audit rate of return (on penalties and due taxes) around 40%. Therefore, the relative superiority of the wbas in the experiment is expected to be emphasized in practice. Step1 : Income reporting.
At the beginning of each period you receive an income of 100 ecus. You must report this income.
To do this, enter the amount you declare on the screen. You are free to declare the amount you want among the integer between 0 and 100 ecus, so 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . , 98, 99 or 100 ecus. You are subject to a levy on your income up to 20% of reported income. This amount is deducted from your income.
Levy= reported income x 0.2 Example: You report an income of 50 ecus. The levy on reported income is 0.2 × 50 = 10 ecus. At the end of step 1, your gain is equal to 100 − 10 = 90 ecus.
Step 2 : Information and whistleblowing.
In this step, you are informed of the amount levied on the income you reported. You are also informed of the income reported by each of the other members of your group. For each of the other members of your group you must decide whether or not you denounce him/her to the central computer. The decision whether to denounce the other members of your group does not aect your earnings, and the other members of your group are not informed of your decision. Denunciation only aects the audit probability for other group members. The audit is implemented by the central computer, according to the procedure described in the following paragraph.
Step 3 : Audits and penalties.
In this step the central computer audits two members of your group. The audit consists in the verication of the declared income by comparison to the 100 ecus of real income. The rule for determining the two audited members in the group depends on the number of denunciations. Each member may be denounced at max four times (by each other member of the group).
The procedure is as follows. The central computer starts by looking at whether there are members of the group who have four denunciations. If there are more than two, he shall draw two of them at random. If there are exactly two, these are audited, and if there is one then it is automatically audited and the central computer then checks whether there are members who have three denunciations. If there is more than one then it draws randomly the one who will be the second one audited. If there is exactly one then it is the second member audited, and if there is none, then the central computer looks at whether there are members with two denunciations . . . so on so far until the central computer has two persons to audit.
Example 1: Member A has four denunciations, members C and D have three denunciations, member E has one and member B has zero denunciation. In this case the two members controlled by the central computer are, on the one hand, member A, and on the other hand either member C or D depending on the random draw.
Example 2: Members B, C and E have three denunciations, member D has one and member A has zero denunciation. In this case the two members controlled by the computer are randomly drawn from members B, C and E.
Example 3: Member C has one denunciation, and the other four members have zero denunciation. In this case the two members controlled by the central computer are on the one hand member C, and on the other hand, a member drawn among members A, B, D and E.
Audited subjects for whom the central computer nds a dierence between the income declared and the 100 ecus of real income pay a penalty equal to 2.5 times the amount of the unpaid levy. Penalty = [(income -reported income) x 0.2] x 2.5 Example: one of the two members of your group audited by the central computer reported100 ecus, he therefore does not pay a penalty. The other has declared 60 ecus, he must therefore pay a penalty equal to [(100 − 60) × 0.2] × 2.5 = 20 ecus.
There is no screen for this step, the audits are carried out by the central computer and the penalties are calculated automatically by the latter and appear in the screen summary of the period .
Step 4 : Period payo and summary of the current period.
The period payo is equal to the income less the levy less the possible penalty.
Period payo = income -levy -possible penalty After step 3, the summary of the period is displayed, it summarizes what happened in the current period. The screen is divided into three areas. In the upper box, you are reminded of the income you reported, the amount of the income declared by each of the other members of your group and your decision to denounce them or not. In the center area, you are informed whether you have been controled and if so the potential amount of the penalty you paid. In the bottom area you are informed of your earnings for the current period. Your payo for this part of the experience is equal to your cumulative payo over the 20 periods, converted into euro according to the following conversion rate: 100 ecus = 0.75 euro. 
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